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GERRIT STEUNEBRINK 
 
 
 
INDIAN PHILOSOPHY AS A JOINT PRODUCT 
OF DIFFERENT PHILOSOPHICAL CULTURES 
 
 
People are of course sensitive about the achievements of their cultural regions 
and national identities. They can become upset to think that in singling out 
some areas and epochs of human history as being highly productive other 
countries are being downgraded. But the dignity of the human being is not re-
lated to the putative glories of her or his ancestors. Moreover, if we look at 
human life in a broader sweep, we see that the future is as vital as the past. 
                                                                                                (Ninian Smart)1 
 
Abstract 
The article shows that the concept of ‘Indian Philosophy’ is the joint product 
of two philosophical cultures. One culture is Western philosophy that  feels 
the need for wisdom. Therefore Indian philosophy is conceived of as 
‘mystical’ or ‘spiritual’ philosophy. The other is the Indian nineteenth century 
culture of  reform thinking. Together with Western philologist the Indians 
highlight the ‘mystical’ or ‘spiritual’ school of Vedanta philosophy as ‘the’ 
Indian philosophy. Vedanta philosophy as spiritual philosophy distinguished 
India from the West. It was a political project that functioned within India’s 
quest for independency. Modern Indian philosophers have been in the process 
of reconsidering this concept, especially after the appropriation of Western 
scientific culture.  
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1. Introduction 
In the West and the East, Indian philosophy has been known for a long time 
as a ‘mystical philosophy’. For both Western and Indian philosophers, this 
qualification was not just a neutral academic description, but a polemical 
statement. Both wanted with this qualification to say something about their 
own culture, but each in a different way. Western proponents of Indian phi-
losophy as a mystical philosophy wanted to criticize their own culture for its 
loss of a spiritual dimension, and especially the loss of the unity between phi-
losophy, religion and art. Indian proponents, like Vivekanda, considered their 
mystical philosophy as part of a cultural identity project. “We have what the 
West does not have (anymore),” was their message. At the same time, this was 
of course also a criticism of Western culture. Indeed, for some time, European 
                                                            
1. Ninian Smart, World Philosophies (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 3. 
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and Indian ‘spiritual’ thinkers could work together and feel united by this 
common line of critique. One could even say that the idea itself of an ‘Indian’ 
philosophy is the result of cooperation between Western thinkers and philolo-
gists, on the one hand, and modern reformist thinkers in India, on the other. 
The idea itself represents a culture, or, rather, two cultures. In the West, it rep-
resents an alternative, ‘holistic’ culture and a cultural criticism of romantic 
origin; in India, it represents a culture of growing anti-colonial self-
consciousness, an awareness of a national identity that distinguishes India 
from a West that is manifest in an overpowering science, technology and in-
dustrialization.  
It is interesting to see that mystical philosophy in India, in the form of Ve-
danta philosophy, became, politically speaking, a very influential identity pro-
ject. The first vice-president and second president of independent India was 
the famous scholar Sarvepalli Radhakrishan, an expert in both Indian and 
Western philosophy. The discussion of the ‘philosophical’ aspects of Indian 
philosophy shows that we are not only dealing with a philosophical question, 
but with a cultural one, too. As mentioned above, this has to do with the place 
of the spiritual dimension within a scientific culture. Another factor, however, 
is political culture. The political milieu of striving for independence and na-
tion building determined this philosophy as well. It is very interesting to see 
that Vedanta philosophy, therefore, was transformed into a social-political 
philosophy that laid the basis for a human rights framework. This typically 
‘Indian philosophy’ was taken out of its original context to help give founda-
tion to a modern state. At the same time, the ‘mystical’ character of this phi-
losophy was used to give India its own ‘mystical’ identity in opposition to the 
technical-materialistic West. Within this movement, two different philosophi-
cal cultures met each other. First, the cultural critical, ‘alternative’ philosophi-
cal culture in Europe, in which not only academic philology and philosophy 
were involved, but also thinkers with a personal message of wisdom, includ-
ing Hermann Graf Keyserling, who interpreted Weltanschauungen like theos-
ophy, and artistic thinkers like Henry Thoreau, Lev Tolstoy, and Romain Rol-
land. Running parallel is the culture of the national identity project in India. 
The encounter between these two cultures was effective in the construction of 
an Indian philosophy. Following this initial success, a new generation of Indi-
an thinkers criticized the ‘nationalistic’ and ‘mystical’ character given to Indi-
an philosophy as, in fact, un-philosophical. For them Indian philosophy was a 
individual, critical endeavor in relation to their own tradition and which has 
more to offer than mysticism alone. The consequences of the implementation 
of science, technology, industrialization and modern nation-building have de-
termined the current agenda of Indian philosophy. The question thus arises: 
Can we speak of a new philosophical culture in this respect? 
 
2. Indian Philosophy and Philosophy as Mystical Wisdom in the West  
We can give only a short overview here of what happened to philosophy in 
the West that caused, at the turn of the eighteenth century, the shift towards 
the idea of ‘Oriental philosophy’, which included not only Indian, but also 
Chinese philosophy. Although we will only speak about Indian philosophy 
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here, we will in this section use the exotic-sounding word ‘Oriental philoso-
phy’, as it represents exceptionally well the atmosphere in which Indian phi-
losophy arose. The truly philosophical character of ‘Oriental philosophy’ was 
always disputed. Among modern philosophers, Hans-Georg Gadamer, for ex-
ample, did not accept the idea of ‘Oriental philosophy’. This is because the 
borders, especially those between philosophy, religion and the sciences, are 
not clearly drawn in this philosophy. Philosophy, according to Gadamer, is 
unequivocally connected to the idea of science, and the identity of philosophy 
in Europe is understood in its distinction from religion and art. Gadamer pre-
supposes the “functional differentiation between those fields as the necessary 
prerequisite of philosophy that started in Greece and is an essential part of Eu-
ropean culture.”2 Although Gadamer is known for his historical knowledge of 
Greek philosophy, this description of philosophy with regard to the other 
types of spiritual life is very much influenced by the movements of the nine-
teenth century. In that age especially, the relationship between philosophy and 
science became very tight and the border with religion increasingly sharply 
defined. This was, however, not always the case. When we look at Greek phi-
losophy, we discover with great ease that, for Plato, philosophy was more than 
just science. It was the science of the good, and hence also the right way of 
living. It was in turn, therefore, related to happiness. Finding the path to the 
right way of living was, at the same time, the path towards true happiness. 
This search for the right way of living, based on ‘the good’ as the fundament 
of all morality, was the natural end for man as a rational being, as a being 
striving for the true and the good. Stoic philosophy developed, more than any 
other, a real philosophical lifestyle on this basis. To this lifestyle belonged 
meditation, ‘ascetic training’ and ‘spiritual exercises’. To this Neo-Platonism 
contributed a mystical dimension. Both tendencies had such a great influence 
on Christianity that their practical-mystical dimension in particular disap-
peared into Christianity, and was integrated into its monastic lifestyle. The re-
sult, however, was that philosophy ultimately lost this dimension. In the be-
ginning, those types of philosophies fitted very well to the Church Fathers’ 
concept of a ‘Christian philosophy’, in which faith, philosophy and theology 
would be united. But when the borders between philosophy and theology were 
drawn more clearly, the ideal of a happy life being a philosophical life disap-
peared. This happened most of all under the influence of the introduction of 
Aristotelianism. Although Aristotle, at the end of his Nichomachean Ethics, 
talks about the philosophical life as one that focuses on the contemplation of 
‘divine things’, such as the happy life, St Thomas Aquinas subordinated this 
to the happiness of faith. Therefore, in the final analysis, Aquinas can say that 
philosophy does not make one happy, only faith can do this.3 Philosophy was 
                                                            
2. Hans-Georg Gadamer, “Europa und die Oikoumene,” in Hans-Georg Gadamer, 
Hermeneutik in Rückblick [Gesammelte Werke Bd. 10] (Tübingen: Mohr, 1995), pp. 268, 
280. 
3. See Pierre Hadot, Exercises spirituels et philosophie antique (Paris: Études 
augustiniennes 1981), and J. Aertsen, “Mittelalterliche Philosophie – ein unmögliches 
Projekt? Zur Wende des Philosophieverständnisses im 13. Jahrhundert,” in J. A  Aertsen, A. 
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thus reduced to science, and to it belonged the empirical sciences that formed 
part of Aristotelian thought. Christianity contributed in this way to the ‘secu-
larization’ of philosophy and to the introduction of the empirical sciences: phi-
losophy is only science, nothing more. Especially with regard to non-Western 
philosophy, one cannot overstate the consequences for Western culture of this 
turn. It was the Arabs, the Muslim philosophers, who made Aristotle available 
for the West, but in the end the Muslim world did not accept Aristotle, while 
Western Christianity did. Islamic philosophy, under the influence of Al-
Ghazali, made a turn towards mysticism instead. The positive reception of Ar-
istotle in the West cannot be seen as an effect of Christianity as such, since 
Eastern Orthodox Christianity declined to accept Aristotelianism. Eastern Or-
thodoxy, too, preferred mysticism, e.g., in St. Gregory of Palamas, and did not 
make the move from Neo-Platonism to Aristotelianism. They thus closed 
themselves off from the development of the empirical sciences. It was the in-
troduction of Oriental philosophy in the West, some centuries later that rein-
troduced mysticism into philosophy once again. 
At the time of the Enlightenment, the ideal of philosophy was of course 
closely tied to the ideals of modern science, even though, paradoxically, Aris-
totelianism was the main target of its criticism. At the same time, however, the 
ideal of philosophy as a way of life and, therefore, as wisdom became popular 
again, together with the growing popularity of Stoic philosophy in general. 
Voltaire defended the philosophical way of life as being quiet and tolerant 
against the dogmatic, fanatical religious way of life, and Boethius’ Consola-
tion of Philosophy was widely read during this period. In the form of ‘popular 
philosophy’, some German philosophers in particular tried to revitalize the 
idea of philosophy as a wisdom everyone could attain. Kant, who was in-
volved in the debates around this type of philosophy, defended the ideal be-
hind it vigorously, but stressed the need for a scientific form of philosophy to 
begin with. Transcendental philosophy, according to him, is about the condi-
tions of possibility of knowledge and ethics, and it is the only scientific way of 
actually doing philosophy: it is the necessary basis for everything that fol-
lows.4 On this account, the philosopher has a duty to inspire human beings to 
choose the right way of living. That approach, however, was then considered a 
special, ‘pragmatic’ branch of philosophy. Kant’s own Anthropology from a 
Pragmatic Point of View is a book with such an aim. The wise philosophers to 
whom Kant turns most are Shaftesbury and Cicero. Hegel, in his turn, radical-
ized the ideas of Kant. He could not take seriously those ‘existential’ brands 
of philosophy that aim to help one realize one’s own life. Indeed, he despised 
the popular Stoicism of his time and gave a place in philosophy to neither 
Cicero and Stoicism nor to Blaise Pascal. Therefore, ‘popular philosophy’ was 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Speer, eds., Geistesleben im 13. Jahrhundert [Miscellanea mediaevalia, vol. 27] (Berlin & 
New York: De Gruyter 2000), pp. 12-28. 
4. Immanuel Kant, Verkündigung des nahen Abschlusses eines Tractats zum ewigen 
Frieden in der Philosophie [Akademie TextAusgabe Bd.VIII] (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 
1968), p. 421, Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft, [Akademie TextAusgabe Bd.V] (Berlin: 
Walter de Gruyter, 1968), p. 63. 
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no longer considered as a real philosophy and was ejected from the history of 
philosophy.5 In the context of the discussion titled ‘What is real philosophy?’ 
Hegel discusses the philosophical character of ‘Oriental philosophy’. In this 
text, he outright opposes to his old, sworn enemy Friedrich von Schlegel, who 
occupied the first chair of indology in Germany. 
Schlegel conceived of philosophy, especially Indian philosophy, from the 
point of view of the unity of philosophy, religion and poetry (mythology).6 It 
was Hegel who reproached him for taking the religion of India as its philoso-
phy;7 here we find the roots of the discussion over whether Indian philosophy 
should be considered as philosophy or as religion. Schlegel wrote from the 
point of view of the critique of modernity. He deplored the lost unity of Eu-
rope and took refuge in other cultures, from Greek culture to Indian culture 
and finally the Catholic Middle Ages. The bridge linking Britain and Germany 
in this respect is the famous indologist Max Müller. He was familiar with the 
works of Kant, Schelling, Hegel and Schlegel, and as Indian and Western phi-
lologists collaborated on the publication of early Indian texts, he went to Eng-
land and became the editor of the famous series The Sacred Books of the East. 
The exchange between Britain and Germany in fact, however, began earlier, 
as Hegel and Schlegel made use of the texts that were translated and edited by 
early British indologist like Sir William Jones, who worked in a colonial set-
ting. 
In the nineteenth century, alternative world-views like theosophy arose in 
the West and looked for allies in Eastern wisdom and indology. The president 
of the theosophist movement, Madame Blavatsky, contacted Max Müller with 
this goal in mind. This is a sign of the milieu in which ‘Oriental wisdom’ or 
‘Oriental philosophy’ became popular: the nineteenth century was not only the 
world of positivism and scientific progress, but also of ‘alternative’ world-
views [Weltanschauungen]. ‘World-views’ are all-encompassing pictures of 
reality, in which the tendency of human thinking towards totality is accorded 
prime status. This drive, which, according to Kant, was a natural tendency of 
human thinking, could no longer be rewarded scientifically; therefore, in so 
far as it was a world-view, metaphysics was no science. But this drive did, 
nonetheless, find its goal in world-views: perspectives in which religious, 
philosophical and scientific ideas were united, as is now the case in the ‘New 
Age’ movement. Several political ideologies belong to this category as well, 
and Marxism-Leninism, as a ‘scientific, all-encompassing world-view’ is one 
of its paradoxical results. 
As a reaction, the discussion about the borders between philosophy and 
other world-views became sharpened in academic circles. Traditional Europe-
an philosophy made these frontiers still sharper and any relationship with reli-
                                                            
5. G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie (Hamburg: Felix 
Meiner, 1994), Teil I, p. 131f. 
6. F. Schlegel, Ueber die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier [orig. 1808], F. Bopp, Über 
das Conjugationssystem der Sanskritsprache [1816], reprint in History of Linguistics, 18th 
and 19th Century German Linguistics (Routledge: Thoemes Press, 1995), pp. 205 ff. 
7. Hegel, Vorlesungen, Teil I, p. 376. 
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gion became an object of suspicion. In this respect, it is necessary to take a 
close look at the famous indologist Heinrich Zimmer, who set himself off 
against both the German and Anglo-Saxon worlds. Deeply rooted in the Ro-
mantic tradition, he protested against both the modern scientific world-view 
and dogmatic Christianity, and took refuge in Indian wisdom. He understood 
it as philosophy, but as philosophy closely related to religion and mysticism. 
To defend this combination as a genuine philosophical option, he referred to 
Stoic and Neo-Platonic philosophy and the Christian counterparts they had in 
the likes of St Augustine and Meister Eckhart.8 Zimmer tells us that in his 
days, during the inter-war years, the idea of an Oriental or Indian philosophy 
was hotly debated. In fact, it was almost blasphemous to speak of ‘Indian phi-
losophy’. Gadamer, to whose circle Zimmer belonged, never accepted the idea 
of an Indian philosophy, as we have seen. Between the two world wars, how-
ever, when Germany in particular had to lick its wounds, there existed a philo-
sophical climate that encouraged the acceptance of Oriental philosophy. Her-
mann Graf Keyserling comes to mind as an initiator of something like a 
‘world philosophy’. Indeed, one could foster this cultural criticism by looking 
back at mediaeval times, as in the case of Neo-Thomism, or at the early Ro-
mantic age of Schlegel, or try to find the solution for the problems of modern 
Europe by reading Nikolai Berdyaev, Lev Tolstoy and Fëdor Dostoevsky and 
learning about the Eastern European Orthodox world. The poems of the young 
Rainer Maria Rilke, the Stundenbuch [Book of Hours], are a testament to this 
project. 
These movements, along with Theosophy and Anthroposophy, protested 
actively against Western rationalism. This was fertile ground for the interac-
tion between India and Europe. When Gandhi came to England around this 
time, he immediately found his way in the Theosophist movement, and later, 
Theosophy influenced the well-known scholar on Buddhism Edward Conze. 
Gandhi was also influenced by Tolstoy and alternative thinkers, such as Tho-
reau. Rabindranath Tagore was, in these days, popular all across Europe and 
he found a home in the circle of the French novelist Romain Rolland, who 
wrote books about the Indian mystic Ramakrishna, the reformist Vivekananda, 
and Gandhi. In Germany, Tagore studied in Marburg and frequented the same 
company as Zimmer and Gadamer; he was known in the circles of Keyserling 
and Rilke, too. We can, therefore, speak of a specific culture in which the idea 
of Oriental philosophy was able to flourish. It came to fill the gap left by ‘sci-
entific philosophy’ and rationalistic Christianity. It is remarkable that in those 
times, within Christianity and existential philosophy, Saint Augustine became 
popular again as representing the idea of the ‘Philosophia Christiana’. This 
philosophical culture was jointly responsible for the reputation of Indian phi-
losophy in Europe as a mystical philosophy, and for the reputation of India as 
a mystical country contrasted with the West as a technical and scientific cul-
ture. The tail end of this can be seen in the hippie and New Age movements of 
the 1960s. 
                                                            
8. Heinrich Zimmer, Philosophie und Religion Indiens (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1973 
[orig. Philosophies of India (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1969)]), p. 19. 
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This was a holistic culture, and it referred to a wound in the history of 
Western philosophy. That wound was the disappearance of the ideal of phi-
losophy as practical wisdom. Of course, this ideal did not disappear in its en-
tirety. It could be said to have continued its existence under the guise of exis-
tential philosophy and in critical and esthetical essays. We immediately think 
of Søren Kierkegaard in this respect, but in the latter half of the twentieth cen-
tury, for example, Michel Foucault reestablished the value of Stoic philosophy 
as lifestyle philosophy. Already from Romantic times onwards, the Western 
conception of Indian philosophy played the role of philosophy as practical 
wisdom, neglected by philosophical and Christian-theological rationalism. We 
can find here, therefore, a special ‘philosophical culture’, a soil in which a 
specific type of philosophy blooms. What made up this environment was the 
culture of indology, cultural criticism and alternative movements like the the-
osophist movement and political movements aimed at uniting the world, as 
well as ‘world philosophy’ movements. We will talk below about the decline 
of this philosophical culture in indological studies, together with the decline of 
that other ‘philosophical’ culture, the culture of Indian reformist thinking. 
Here, the idea of national identity and the tendency to describe Indian philos-
ophy as mystical are of importance. Here too, however, the political element is 
also central, as it fuses with the mystical elements of Indian philosophy.  
 
3. Indian ‘Mystical’ Philosophy as an Expression of a National Identity 
Project 
3.A. Indian Philosophy between Colonialism and Nationalism 
Western romantics are not alone in categorizing Indian thought as mystical 
and wise: Indian thinkers have also participated in this description. They 
themselves have popularized the division between scientific, technical and 
materialist directed thinking from Europe, on the one hand, and mystical 
thinking from the East, on the other. The term ‘philosophy’ was introduced, 
together with Western philosophy, to Indian thought in the nineteenth century. 
While philosophy as such was something new, people did recognize some-
thing in it that was already a part of their tradition. Philosophy was translated 
in common use as the term ‘darsana’. Etymologically speaking, the meaning 
of ‘darsana’ is ‘to see’, and is related to the devotional view directed towards 
the idea of God. In relation to philosophy, however, it means a ‘way of seeing’ 
or ‘system of thought’ and was traditionally used in the context of the six clas-
sical Indian systems of thought: the subjects covered in it match completely 
the Western philosophical tradition. These systems do not deal with the mysti-
cal, monastic or semi-monastic philosophy of Vedanta alone (connected as it 
is with the Mimamsa School in addition to the schools of logic, epistemology 
and philosophy of science in the Nyava-Vaishesika), but also speaks on the 
dualistic Shamkya School, which is connected to the Yoga School. These six 
schools form the canon of Indian thought. A particular way of thinking or 
writing cannot be said to belong to one or the other of these six schools, as 
they can when it concerns the political writings, the ‘arthashastras’. The ar-
thashastras are the practically oriented writings dealing with the subject of 
how to handle politics, and are frequently labeled materialistic. Questions of 
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political direction do not, therefore, come to the fore in the six official 
darsanas. This, however, was to change radically in the reformist thought of 
the nineteenth century with the help, as we shall see, of the mystical Vedanta 
philosophy. 
‘Darsana’ does not refer to the activity of philosophizing itself; one cannot 
‘do darsana.’ When Indian thinkers use the term ‘darsana’ for their own mode 
of thought, they do so in an objectifying and polemical context: their system 
of thought, ‘their darsana’, versus ‘our darsana’. This use of the word ‘darsa-
na’ clearly differs from another, competing usage, where ‘darsana’ is translat-
ed as ‘insight into truth’, a realization of the absolute. This last meaning, clos-
est to the neutral meaning of a system of thought, came into use as a result of 
the interpretation from a European perspective. The term acquires a mystical 
meaning in the reformist thought of India, which includes the idea of a single 
‘Hinduism’, as will be explained below. The meaning of ‘to see’ is interpreted 
as an intuitive ‘Seeing,’ an immediate realization of the absolute, a form of 
‘intellectual Anschauung [apperception]’, achieved by the representatives of 
‘vedanta philosophy’. This ‘seeing’ is essentially distinct from the abstract, 
theoretical-objectifying spirit of European philosophy. The picture of a mysti-
cal philosophy, with religious connotations and implications for the direction 
of practical thought, and set off against a Western philosophy that is essential-
ly scientific, originates in this tendency to view Vedanta thought as ‘the’ phi-
losophy of India.9 But why is this mystical philosophy seen as the pre-eminent 
form of Indian philosophy? To answer this question, we must turn to the at-
tempts to reform the traditional religious life of India by both the British, and 
thus Europeans in general, and the Indians themselves, as well as to the con-
sequences thereof. 
In a very interesting analysis, Trevor Ling shows how the English coloniz-
ers became interested in the development of an ‘Indian philosophy’.10 As a re-
action to the Christian inspired colonial sense of supriority of the English, es-
pecially with regard to the abuses of Indian popular religion, the higher casts 
in India began to develop their own ‘sense of equal worth’ in relation to the 
English by referring to their intellectual tradition. The English, troubled by lo-
cal uprisings which had popular religious motivations, had political reasons 
for supporting this new Indian self-awareness against the arrogant Christian 
sense of superiotity of the missionaries. Lord Wellesley, Governor-General of 
India from 1797 until 1805, desired that the Indian’s themselves develop a 
system of thought that could take hold and function as a ‘civil religion’ in In-
dia, an Indian Church of England. Such a civil religion, Wellesley thought, 
could come from the learned philosophical tradition of Brahmanism, set down 
in old Sanskrit texts that were preserved and studied by ‘pandits’ from Bena-
res and Nabadwip. He actively promoted the study of these texts and set up a 
school in Calcutta in 1800, in which the study of these traditions formed part 
                                                            
9. Wilhelm Halbfass, Indien und Europa, Perspektiven ihrer geistigen Begegnung 
(Basel & Stuttgart: Schwabe & Co, 1981), pp. 335 ff. 
10. Trevor Ling, Karl Marx and Religion in Europe and India (London: Macmillan, 
1980), p. 652. 
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of the training for colonial officials. Lord Hastings, Governor-General of India 
from 1773-1785, had previously set up a school in Bengal, also as a result of 
political motivations, that specialized in teaching according to Indian law 
books, which indologists Colebrook and Jones had derived from Schlegel and 
Hegel. With the help of the Brahman tradition, so Wellesley planned, work 
could begin on a reform of popular Indian religion from the inside out, so that 
the Christians and the higher casts could be content together. The British 
hoped that these new Indian intellectuals, coming from the higher casts, would 
be indebted and thus tied to them. 
This political project was successful: indeed, the revival of the Sanskrit cul-
ture and the modernized variant of the Indian religion were a source of pride 
in their own culture among the higher casts. They felt able to claim that their 
culture stood on a par with that of the Europeans. In the midst of Western law 
and Western education, people could thus claim their own distinct identity. 
Vedanta thought, the mysticism of Atman and Brahman, would function su-
perbly in this milieu. It was considered a higher, and simultaneously ‘more 
truthful’ religion of India, by which traditional popular religion could be criti-
cized and reformed. It could also be seen as an obviously specific and distinct 
Indian philosophy to rival that of the West. Eventually, in this way ‘Hindu-
ism’ as the religion of India came into existence. For ‘Hinduism’ is a neolo-
gism, consciously coined in analogy with ‘Catholicism’ and ‘Protestantism’. 
This understanding of Vedanta philosophy became part of a national identi-
ty project. The Indian texts were published with the help of English and Ger-
man orientalists. The large series ‘Sacred Books of the East,’ edited by the 
German Max Müller, discussed above, who worked in England, comes to 
mind most as an example; the Indians themselves learned about their own re-
ligious tradition through these texts. Without these publications, in fact, the 
Indians would not have come into contact with their own religious heritage. It 
was only through these publications, which allowed the writings to pass from 
the hands of the religious class of priests and become accessible to everyone, 
that something like an ‘Indian philosophy’ finally became possible. On the 
one hand, this revolution made possible the construction of mystical philoso-
phy, as part of a national identity project, while, on the other hand, it also led 
to academic relativism: it was just one philosophy among others. 
 
3.B. ‘Mystical Philosophy’ as a National Identity Project 
The great reformist thinker Ram Mohun Roy (1771-1833), who came from 
a rich Bengali family of the Brahman cast, had come into contact with the 
British orientalist movement and subsequently supported it by providing the 
text of the Upanishads and translations thereof in English and in the modern 
Indian everyday tongue.11 With this, he liberated these texts from the hands of 
those who had traditionally interpreted them and from their selective rules of 
                                                            
11. Victor van Bijlert, “Raja Rammohun Roy’s Thought and its Relevance for Human 
Rights,” in Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na‘im, Jerald D. Gort, Henry Jansen, and Hendrick M. 
Vroom, eds., Human Rights and Religious Values: An Uneasy Relationship? (Amsterdam & 
Grand Rapids: Rodopi/Eerdmans, 1995), p. 99. 
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transmission. Indian thought thus ‘became’ philosophy with the removal of 
the texts from the hands of the priests.  
Roy was, therefore, no longer a ‘pandit’, to be used by the British for a 
specific task, but an independent thinker in his own right. He knew English, 
Persian and Arabic, as well as a number of Indian languages, and later learned 
Hebrew, Greek and Latin in order to read the religious writings of Christianity 
and Judaism in their original languages; he also produced writings on Christi-
anity. Roy took it upon himself to explain Indian tradition to the West. Within 
this project, he could bring Western matters into Indian thought and give them 
a place. According to Roy, the Upanishads and the Vedanta writings, the latter 
of which were based upon the former, taught a theology of enlightenment and 
insight, and as such represented true Hinduism. From this point onwards, he 
set himself the task of making the writings widely known and building upon 
them a program for the moral and religious renewal of Hinduism through ra-
tionality, humanity and a detailed knowledge of Hindu religious texts. 
Roy developed Vedanta thought into the true (Neo-)Hinduism, which he 
then put to use in criticizing common idolatry and superstition. This refor-
mation, which was welcomed by the British, was not only a superficial ad-
justment for the benefit of eyes in the West; it was an authentic and heartfelt 
evolution of Indian thought. Roy himself wanted to take this development fur-
ther than the British themselves wished. He sought to gain from them a ban on 
the practice of burning widows, arguing that it was not in harmony with the 
core of Indian culture, but the British did not desire such a move. They justi-
fied their colonial obstinacy, arising from a fear of uprisings in response to 
such a ban, with an appeal to the cultural rights of Indians – ultimately, Roy 
could convince them.12 The self-consciousness that developed during the 
reformation as a result of reference to these rights was, against the original in-
tentions of the British, the source of the desire of independence. On the basis 
of Roy’s mystical view of humanity, derived from Vedanta philosophy, the 
Indian constitution and human rights framework were formulated. 
The unique thing about Roy as a reformist figure, who took as inspiration 
the European reformation of Luther, is precisely that trough him the ethical 
values that were found in the old Indian spirituality were given a modern so-
cial and political significance.13 Originally, this philosophy was not intended 
for this purpose. Law and politics were dealt with through other systems en-
tirely: in the law of Manu and the arthashastras. These contained the law of 
the casts and the godly right of the king. Vedanta philosophy, in contrast, did 
not traditionally contain questions about the exercise of power: it was meant 
for people who, after completing their (mainly higher) cast-prescribed family 
duty to work in society, wanted to connect with their ‘actual self’ and develop 
their relationship with godliness. They would withdraw from their social ac-
tivities and from their families and devote themselves to religious pursuits. 
Roy gave this philosophy a political twist. The ‘actual self’, he argued, is the 
self of everyone and pre-supposes equal dignity. 
                                                            
12. Ibid., p. 100. 
13. Ibid., p. 105; Halbfass, Indien und Europa, p. 236. 
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Just as Roy had brought it to bear on political practice, the reformist thinker 
Vivekananda (1863-1902) used Vedanta thought for a national identity pro-
ject. Vivekananda caused a furor at the World’s Parliament of Religions in 
Chicago in 1893, where he emphasized the contrast between the ‘mystical 
East’ and the technological, materialistic West. With this, he gave Indians an 
identity and Western intellectuals critical of their own culture something that 
satisfied their deepest longing. Since then, Indian thought contained an incli-
nation towards an apologetic usurpation on the understanding of ‘philosophy’ 
in the name of Vedanta. This inclination served a national and cultural self-
reliance: Vedanta is philosophy and as a result, we Indians have our own phi-
losophy which stands at the same, if not a higher, level than that of the West.14 
This period of cultural discovery stimulated research into the history of In-
dian philosophy. For example, the great History of Indian Philosophy by 
Surendranath Dasgupta was published in these years. Dasgupta was even in-
clined to argue that specific ideas in Western philosophy already existed earli-
er in India. It is striking, in this context, that Indian thinkers did not use this 
idea of a ‘mystical identity’ to push Western, technical-materialistic culture 
out the door. This culture would in fact be held on to in its entirety. The em-
phasis on mysticism was, therefore, a way of holding onto a unique identity 
within the process of westernization. Two souls, so to speak, lived in a single 
chest without reconciliation. 
Mystical philosophy finally proved its worth, but in a completely different 
area than that for which it was originally intended: politics and human rights. 
Vedanta philosophy came to be involved in a process of nation-building, of 
which Roy, Vivekananda and Gandhi were the leaders. It is, therefore, not by 
chance that the first vice-president and second president of India, as we noted 
above, was the famous Vedanta philosopher Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan. The 
mysticism of Vedanta was able to fill the gap in the six darsanas, within 
which there was a lack of resources to deal with questions of political direc-
tion. 
Gandhi succeeded in transforming the ascetic practice of Indian spirituality 
into a means of political struggle, with which he stood up for the rights of 
farmers, the poor and those without cast. Just like Vivekananda, he too criti-
cized the technical and materialistic West, and fought against modernization 
and for a simple lifestyle. For this reason, too, he wanted a return to the spin-
ning wheel and the loom as means of production, perhaps also as many Indian 
craftsmen became unemployed as a result of the industrial production of the 
West. But his ‘back to the spinning wheel and loom’ would not be taken to 
heart. Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first prime minister, pressed for the develop-
ment of science and technology as the key to the modernization of India. He 
‘translated’ Gandhi’s neo-Hindusm of satyagraha [the search for truth’] and 
ahimsa [non-violence] in terms of ‘secularism’, ‘socialism’, ‘mixed econo-
my’, ‘democracy’, and ‘neutrality’.15 With this came about a scientific and 
                                                            
14. Halbfass, Indien und Europa, pp. 340ff. 
15. Gerald James Larson, India’s Agony over Religion (Albany: State Univ. of New 
York Press, 1995), p. 199; quoted from Christopher Key Chapple, “Introduction,” in  
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technical development, which would make India a nuclear power, and an in-
dustrialization that, together with a large increase in population, would pro-
duce an ecological disaster. 
What does this say about the position of Eastern mystical philosophy? With 
the benefit of hindsight, we can say that we are dealing with a specific histori-
cal phenomenon and that out of this came a unique philosophical culture. The 
thesis of mystical philosophy as a typically Indian philosophy came to func-
tion within India’s national identity project. It set Indian identity in opposition 
to Europe, while, as was mentioned, so much was in fact taken from Europe. 
At the same time, thanks to the philosophical efforts of Roy, Vivekanda and 
Radhakrishnan, this was not only an academic activity, but also a practical 
one.  
This praxis, however, which they were happy to maintain as a unique prop-
erty of Indian philosophy, was not a merely spiritual and ascetic practice any-
more, but a political praxis of reformation. This reformation aimed at scien-
tific education, technological development, and a legal system that had been 
taken from the West. This has formed the unique philosophical-cultural setting 
of the subsequent development of Indian philosophy. There exists in this set-
ting a tension between, on the one hand, the borrowed technical and political 
culture of the West and, on the other, the emphasis in Indian philosophy on 
the spiritual character as typically Indian. As one might expect, the success of 
the reformation and the implementation of Western achievements finally re-
moved the ground from under the promotion of spiritual philosophy as a typi-
cally Indian philosophy. 
 
3.C. Modern Indian Philosophy: Beyond Mysticism and Nationalism. 
In contemporary Indian philosophy, we see a tendency to take a distance 
from the idea that the mystical ‘Vedanta philosophy’ is the authentic philoso-
phy of India. One must see the choice for the science of wisdom and its prac-
tical-soteriological focus as a very specific selection from the Indian tradition 
that does injustice to the scientific aspects of those traditions of thought as a 
whole. While the ‘spiritual’ Indian tradition is still usually presented as ‘the’ 
Indian philosophy, for example in school books, Indian philosophers are in-
creasingly inclined towards a view of philosophy as science. While in earlier 
days a terrain was sought from which Indian philosophy could rival that of the 
West, now Indian philosophy confronts Western, scientific philosophy on its 
own turf. Radical, perhaps too radical, authors such as Daya Krishna find that 
the view that Indian philosophy is directed towards moshka [salvation], as we 
have seen in the work of Zimmer, rests on pure misunderstanding.16 Jitendra 
Nath Mohanty, an authority on Husserl as well as the Indian tradition, argues 
that while Krishna is indeed successful in unmasking this view as a myth, the 
construction of Western philosophy by, for example, Husserl as purely theo-
                                                                                                                                                                          
Christopher Key Chapple and Mary Evelyn Tucker, eds., Hinduism and Ecology 
(Cambridge MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 2000), p. xxxv. 
16. Daya Krishna, Indian Philosophy, a Counter Perspective (New Delhi: Oxford Univ. 
Press, 1991), pp. 16-34. 
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retical-scientific is similarly a myth.17 Mohanty does not deny that in Vedanta 
thought the concept of salvation is important, but he rejects the idea that this is 
something typical of Indian philosophy and that Indian philosophy deals only 
with this topic. It is important to see here that the self-definition of Indian phi-
losophy signals a new phase in the confrontation with Western thought. For 
Mohanty, this means that the ‘life-world’ of the classic Vedanta is actually 
vanishing, as India has been determined in its course by what was borrowed 
from Western materialistic and scientific culture. The mystical East is thus 
disappearing. 
The situation, however, is not completely acrimonious. There is talk of rec-
onciliation. Such reconciliation comes from the fact that Mohanty is aware of 
the fact that the West is not only the ‘Other’ of, but also part of Indian philos-
ophy. The two souls in this single chest have found one another. He can thus 
dismantle the great opposition between Eastern and Western philosophy. We 
must first consider, he says, the agreement and difference between distinct 
disciplines such as Indian grammar and Western grammar, Indian science and 
Western science. We must split the concept of Indian philosophy into different 
traditions and compare these with corresponding Western traditions. The 
schools of Indian thought wherein logic plays a large role, for example, are 
brought to the fore and can shed light on European problems, because they do 
not work with the traditional Western dichotomies of rationalism and empiri-
cism, and so on and so forth. 
Mohanty also argues that Indian philosophy no longer has the necessity, 
such as it did with Roy, to explain to modern Europeans that which is typical-
ly Indian. That is not the job of philosophy.18 That aspect of the national iden-
tity project to which Indian philosophy was bound has faded away. India has 
now, so writes Mohanty, seen in modernization a necessity for a political phi-
losophy that deals with modern political demands such as democracy, capital-
ism and social egalitarianism. Mohanty can also, in this way, dismantle the 
distinction between tradition and modernity. Tradition is nothing other than 
living tradition, which reacts to change and, as a result, develops further. Mo-
dernity cannot, therefore, be without an element of tradition, otherwise it gets 
lost in an ongoing series of momentary changes. The economist and philoso-
pher Amartya Sen wrote his book The Argumentative Indian, in which he dis-
putes the idea that critical rationality is typically European and not Indian, 
with the same background in mind. For this reason, he gives pride of place to 
the critical argumentation in the Indian tradition and, in addition, the im-
portance of heterodox schooling.19 
We can add to this that Western indology is now ‘normalized’ in the sense 
that it no longer has the contemplative orientation of the nineteenth century; 
                                                            
17. Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Essays on Indian Philosophy (New Delhi: Oxford Univ. 
Press, 1993), pp. 44, 315.  
18. J. N. Mohanty, Reason and Tradition in Indian Thought (Oxford: Clarendon Press 
1992), p. 12; see also Mohanty, Essays on Indian Philosophy, p. 334 
19. Amartya Sen, The Argumentative Indian (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 
2005), p. xiii. 
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nor does it orient itself along the lines of great philosophical systems but, ra-
ther, along those of the whole religious spectrum. This is also a necessity, as 
popular religion in India has developed along its own path and is no longer 
dominated by the pressure for reform coming from Vedanta philosophy. Con-
temporary Western indologists who concern themselves with Indian philoso-
phy know that this tradition of thought is much broader than the mystical Ve-
danta. 
Finally, the interpretation of Indian texts as Indian philosophy, analogous 
to Western philosophy, has had great consequences. As we have noted, the 
classic texts of ‘Indian philosophy’ functioned within the religious teacher-
student dialectic. Above all, these texts were not made accessible to everyone: 
they were reserved for the Brahmans. Removing the texts from the control of 
the priests, making them public and encouraging their academic study, as well 
as their philosophical interpretation (analogous to Western philosophy), has 
had paradoxical results. One the one hand, Indian traditional thought has be-
come a ‘philosophy’, as it was opened up to each person’s individual reflec-
tion and argumentation. On the other hand, however, it was through the same 
process that Indian thought became one academic philosophical discipline 
among others. You can study it if you want . . . , but you are not obliged to do 
so. The fact that there are plenty philosophers in India who know everything 
about Kant and Hegel and yet nothing about Shankara and Ramanuja attests to 
this. Western philosophy has been for a long time already no longer specifical-
ly Western, and ‘Indian philosophy’ has become a specialization in both the 
West and the East. 
At the same time, we see that increasing modernization has led to the dis-
appearance of the specific philosophical culture that itself began the appropri-
ation of modernity and constructed an Indian philosophy. The philosophical 
culture of mysticism and nationalism is, by the end of the day, to a certain ex-
tent the victim of its own success. Indian philosophy is, as we see in the 
thought of Mohanty, no longer a national identity project, but has become just 
another academic discipline among many. 
 
4. Conclusion: Towards a New Philosophical Culture? 
Now that Indian philosophy is just one specialization among others in phi-
losophy, does this mean that the two philosophical approaches –that of the al-
ternative, cultural critique and that of the national identity project– should be 
left by the wayside, that they no longer have any value? As far as I am con-
cerned, the answer is “No”. The content of the alternative culture-critical 
school, the critique of Western technological, scientific and materialistic 
thought, still applies; even more so as Western modernity comes to take hold 
everywhere. The materialistic ‘diseases’ of Western culture prove to be attrac-
tive to everyone. It is precisely this spread of the Western lifestyle over the 
whole world that reveals its material borders. One result of the ecological con-
sequences of this is the whole culture-critical analysis of Western modernity, 
with its science, technology, capitalism, industrialization, domination of na-
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ture, and endless differentiation of needs.20 In politics, ‘sustainability’ and 
‘sustainable development’ have now taken central stage: we would need to 
have three planets in order for the whole world to produce and consume at the 
level of Western material civilization. 
My concern is, then, that the Western lifestyle is in fact not universalizable. 
In view of these ecological, material borders, a shortage of ideals also comes 
to the fore. The disappearance of an alternative like Indian philosophy means 
that the Western, culture-critical person can no longer take refuge in non-
Western cultures, as these are all implicated in the selfsame process. Con-
versely, this also means that India can no longer characterize itself as ‘mysti-
cal’ in opposition to the West, since the mystical philosophy of India has in no 
sense stood in the way of the adoption of a Western, technical-materialistic 
culture. Mysticism and ecological damage prove to go together very well. The 
national context is now no longer one of a characterization of cultural identity, 
but of international cooperation linked with the management of modernity, of 
which everyone wants to take a part, and in which everyone wants to take 
part. 
Perhaps a new philosophical culture will come into being in this context. 
Of course, one cannot design such a culture. A specific philosophical culture, 
in fact, frequently acts as a limitation, a sort of background, that is not reflect-
ed upon, and which implies given borders. Practically speaking, however, one 
could well plead for the founding of a culture of philosophers who, all across 
the world, are in contact with one another, who are conscious of their cultural 
backgrounds and of the role played by the interaction between these back-
grounds. The goal of such a culture would surely be the critical analysis of 
modernity, which is not, it should be noted, tantamount to its condemnation. 
Modernity is what now brings people across the world into contact with one 
another and this should be seen as a positive development. At the same time, 
however, it is on these grounds that an intercultural critique of modernity is 
both possible and necessary. With modernity also comes the universal critique 
of modernity. The object of this critique ought to be the quasi-detachment of 
modernity as a universal reflexivity, both in terms of theory and culture, on 
the one hand, and practice and materiality, on the other.21 
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20. See Vittorio Hösle, Praktische Philosophie in der modernen Welt (München: Ch. 
Beck, 1995), pp. 166-99. 
21. See also the interview with Thorsten Botz-Bornstein in this issue. 
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